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INTERGRAPH CORPORATION V. INTEL
CORPORATION
Richard J. Gray' and David Banie"
I. BACKGROUND
The parties involved in this case are Intel Corporation ("Intel")
and Intergraph Corporation ("Intergraph").' Intel, a manufacturer of
semiconductors, appealed the grant of a preliminary injunction
granted to Intergraph by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama. Intergraph is an original equipment
manufacturer, or OEM, which develops, makes and sells computer
workstations. From 1987 to 1993 Intergraph's workstations used a
microprocessor based on "Clipper" technology. In 1993 Intergraph
discontinued use of the Clipper microprocessor and switched to
Intel's microprocessor. By 1994 Intel designated Intergraph as a
"strategic customer" and provided Intergraph with proprietary
information and early access to samples of new microprocessors
under non-disclosure agreements. Intergraph retained ownership of
patents relating to the Clipper technology.
In 1996 Intergraph asserted claims of infringement of the Clipper
patent against several Intel OEM customers. These customers sought
indemnification from Intel, and negotiations ensued between Intel and
Intergraph in this matter. Although Intel sought a license to the
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Clipper patent, Intergraph rejected the proposed terms as inadequate.
As negotiations failed between Intel and Intergraph, Intel
discontinued providing technical assistance and other special benefits
to Intergraph.
Tensions between the two parties escalated and in 1997
Intergraph filed suit against Intel claiming: Infringement of the
Clipper patents, fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, negligence,
wantonness and willfulness, breach of contract, intentional
interference with business relations, breach of express and implied
warranties, and violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act.
Thereafter, Intergraph amended its complaint to charge Intel with
violations of antitrust laws.
After a hearing for a preliminary injunction, the district court
held that Intergraph was likely to prevail on its claims that Intel was a
monopolist and had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. As
a result, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against Intel
which included the following provisions: (1) "Intel shall supply
Intergraph with all Intel product information, including... technical,
design, development, defect, specification, support, supply, future
product .... ;"2 (2) "Intel shall supply Intergraph with an allocation,
and set aside a supply of microprocessors, semiconductors, chips, and
buses ("Chips") on an advance basis for product development... ;"I
(3) "Intel shall supply Intergraph with an allocation, and set aside a
supply, of Chips which have been manufactured by or on behalf of
Intel for distribution ("Production Chips"), as well as all future chips
proposed by, or available from Intel... ;"4 and (4) "Intel shall supply
Intergraph with Production Chips not yet available from Intel's
authorized distributors . ... "5 The district court also found that Intel
had a contractual agreement to provide the benefits, including Intel's
"continued [product] support," contained in the injunction.6 Intel
appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
II. HOLDING, RATIONALE AND DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the antitrust rulings of
the district court were incorrect in law or were devoid of sufficient
factual support to present a substantial likelihood of establishing an
2. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
3. Id. at 1292.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 1282.
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antitrust law violation with respect to the issues presented. 7
Specifically, Intergraph did not show a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits that Intel violated the antitrust laws in its actions
with respect to Intergraph, or that Intel agreed by contract to provide
the benefits contained in the injunction.' In its own words, the
Federal Circuit held that "Intel's conduct with respect to Intergraph
[did] not constitute the offense of monopolization or the threat thereof
in any market relevant to competition with Intergraph."9  In so
holding, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court's findings that
Intel competed against Intergraph in two key markets: (1) the market
for high end microprocessors, and (2) the submarket of Intel
microprocessors.10
The Federal Circuit also rejected Intergraph's argument "that it
compete[d] in the microprocessor market by virtue of its Clipper
patents."'11 According to the court:
[Tihe patent grant is a legal right to exclude, not a commercial
product in a competitive market. Intergraph abandoned the
production of Clipper microprocessors in 1993, and state[d] no
intention to return to it. Firms do not compete in the same market
unless, because of the reasonable interchangeability of their
products, they have the actual or potential ability to take significant
business away from each other.12
Relying on this key holding, the Federal Circuit then discussed,
inter alia, the following theories relied on by the district court in
finding a probable violation of the Sherman Act: (1) the 'Essential
Facility" doctrine; (2) refusal to deal; (3) leveraging; (4) coercive
reciprocity and tying; (5) the use of intellectual property to restrain
trade; and (6) breach of contract. 3
A. The "Essential Facility" Doctrine
First, the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in
7. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
8. See id.
9. Id. at 1356.
10. See id. at 1355.
11. Id.
12. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1355 (citing U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7
F.3d 986, 995 (1lth Cir. 1993)).
13. See id. at 1367. The Federal Circuit also rejected the district court's finding that Intel
was contractually obligated to provide Intergraph with the benefits contained in the injunction,
because it found no such contractual promise. See id. at 1367.
2000]
440 COMPUTER HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAWJOURNAL [Vol.16
holding that Intel's actions in withdrawing advance design and
technical information violated the Sherman Act under the "essential
facility" theory.14  The essential facility doctrine imposes liability
when one firm denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or
service that the second firm must obtain in order to effectively
compete with the first. 5 In MCI Communications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., the court enumerated the elements of
liability under the "essential facilities" theory as "(1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the
denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility
of providing the facility."' 6 Furthermore, "the courts have required
anticompetitive action by a monopolist that is intended to 'eliminate
competition in the downstream market.' ' 17
The district court found that "the [a]dvance [c]hips [s]amples
and advance design and technical information are essential products
and information necessary for Intergraph to compete in its markets.' 8
According to the district court, Intel's actions in withholding these
benefits violated the Sherman Act because "[t]he antitrust laws
impose on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to
make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms."'19 Contrary
to this finding, the Federal Circuit found that "[a] non-competitor's
asserted need for a manufacturer's business information does not
convert the withholding of that information into an antitrust
violation. '20 The Federal Circuit further noted that "precedent is quite
clear that the essential facility theory does not depart from the need
for a competitive relationship in order to incur Sherman Act liability
and remedy."' 2' Specifically, "there must be a market in which
plaintiff and defendant compete, such that a monopolist extends its
monopoly to the downstream market by refusing access to the facility
it controls.' '22 As no such competitive relationship is present here, the
14. See id. at 1356-57.
15. See id. at 1356 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542
(9th Cir. 1991)).
16. See id. at 1357 (citing MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Corp.., 708 F.2d 1081,
1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983)).
17. See id. at 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 544-45).
18. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
19. Id. at 1277.
20. hItergraph, 195 F.3d at 1357.
21. Id. at 1356. See also Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d
1080,1088 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
22. Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1357.
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essential facility theory did not support the district court's finding of a
Sherman Act violation.23
B. Refusal to Deal
Second, the district court erroneously found Intergraph likely to
prevail on a claim of Intel's violation of antitrust laws based on a
theory of refusal to deal.24 One of the oldest principles of antitrust
law is the right to deal, or not to deal, with whomever one pleases.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held, "[i]n the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict
the long recognized right of trader or a manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."2 However, a
"refusal to deal" may raise antitrust concerns when the purpose is to
create, maintain, or enlarge a monopoly.26 Moreover,
[A] monopolist's unilateral refusal to deal with its competitor (as
long as the refusal harms the competitive process) may constitute
prima facie evidence of exclusionary conduct in the context of a
section 2 claim. A monopolist may nevertheless rebut such
evidence by establishing a valid business justification for its
conduct.27
In this case, "[a]lthough the district court found that there was a
lack of business justification for Intel's actions, there was no showing
of harm to competition with Intel; thus the need did not arise to
establish the defense of business justification.12  Furthermore, a
manufacturer is "'under no duty to help [plaintiff] or other peripheral
equipment manufacturers survive or expand."' 29 The Federal Circuit
further noted the following:
Although [this court] observed a few rulings wherein a court has,
for example, barred the termination of a distributor during
litigation, no case has held that the divulgation of proprietary
information and the provision of special or privileged treatment to
23. See id. at 1358.
24. See id. at 1359.
25. Id. at 1358 (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919)).
26. See id. at 1358.
27. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,483
n.32 (1992)).
28. Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1359.
29. Id. (quoting California Computer Prod., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
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a legal adversary can be compelled on a "refusal to deal" antitrust
premise.30
Likewise, Intel was under no such duty to provide Intergraph
with "strategic customer" benefits; absent a showing of harm to
competition, Intel's decision to discontinue its prior dealings with
Intergraph raised no antitrust concerns.3'
C. Leveraging
Third, the district court erred in holding that Intel's expansion
into the computer workstation and graphic subsystems markets (by
virtue of Intel's agreement to purchase Chips & Technology
Company, an experienced producer of graphics chips and chip sets)
constituted a sufficient foundation, by itself, for a finding of illegal
leveraging.32 In deciding the issue, the court stressed the following:
Intergraph made no proffer to show that Intel possessed market
power in either the graphics subsystems market or the workstation
market .... An integrated business does not offend the Sherman
Act by drawing on its competitive advantages of efficiency,
experience, or reduced transaction costs, in entering new fields.
These advantages are not uses of monopoly power.33
The district court relied on Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. for the proposition that "the Sherman Act is violated if monopoly
power in one market provides a 'competitive advantage' in another
market, whether or not there is an intent to create a monopoly in the
second market. 3 4 However, the district court failed to consider that
"there was no economic evidence or proffer concerning Intel's
participation in the downstream market."35  To establish illegal
leveraging of monopoly power the challenged conduct must
"threaten[ ] the [second] market with the higher prices or reduced
output or quality associated with the kind of monopoly that is
ordinarily accompanied by a large market share. '3 6
The Federal Circuit observed that "antitrust liability based on
30. Id. at 1358.
31. See id. at 1359.
32. See id. at 1360.
33. Id. See also AD/SAT, A Division of Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216,
230 (2d Cir. 1999).
34. Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1359 (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir 1979)).
35. Id. at 1359.
36. Id. (citing 3 PIuLup E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 652c,
at 90 (rev. ed. 1996)).
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leveraging of monopoly power is a concept of imprecise definition,
for the courts have varied in their requirements of the nature of the
advantage obtained in the assertedly leveraged market."37
Furthermore, the court noted that the Second Circuit has rejected the
type of broad reading of Berkey Photo that the district court has
adopted.3 8 Specifically, the Second Circuit held that a "Sherman Act
violation based on leveraging requires a showing of 'tangible harm to
competition' in the second market."39
The Federal Circuit further noted that other circuits have
explicitly rejected Berkey Photo.4 For example, the Third Circuit
held that "a section 2 leverage claim requires the use of monopoly
power in the second market, and that a mere attempt to gain a
competitive advantage is insufficient as a matter of law. '41 The Ninth
Circuit stated that "the elements of established actions for
'monopolization' and 'attempted monopolization' are vital to
differentiate between efficient and natural monopolies on the one
hand, and unlawful monopolies on the other. '42  "Berkey Photo's
monopoly leveraging doctrine fails to differentiate properly among
monopolies. '43 The Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue as follows:
"Berkey Photo [does not] extend to a situation in which a monopolist
projects its power into a market it not only does not seek to
monopolize, but in which it does not even seek to compete."44
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the use of a position in
one market to gain an advantage in another market is not an illegal
market restraint unless "a significant fraction of buyers or sellers are
frozen out of a market."45 Thus, the district court's decision was in
direct conflict with Eleventh Circuit precedent.46  In addition, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court apparently based its
decision on a per se theory of future Sherman Act violation; however,
37. Id. at 1359.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 1359 (citing Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.
1990)).
40. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1359-60.
41. Id. at 1360 (citing Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.
1992)).
42. Id. (citing Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548-49).
43. Id. (citing Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548-49).
44. Id. (citing Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co. 145 F.3d 1258, 1262
( lIth Cir. 1998)).
45. Id. (quoting Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc. 758 F.2d 1486, 1503-04 (11th
Cir. 1985)).
46. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1360.
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the Federal Circuit rejected this unwarranted "enlargement of antitrust
theory and policy to prohibit downstream integration by a monopolist
into new markets. '47
D. Coercive Reciprocity and Tying
Fourth, the district court erred in finding that Intel engaged in
unlawful "coercive reciprocity," defined by the district court as "the
practice of using economic leverage in one market coercively to
secure competitive advantage in another," by its proposals to settle
the patent disputes.4 "To violate the Sherman Act the entity that
coerces reciprocal dealing must be a monopolist in one product and
thus be positioned to require dealing in the coerced product, which
but for the monopolist's coercion could be acquired elsewhere. '49 For
example, in Betaseed, Inc. v. U&I Inc., Betaseed excluded
competition in the market for beet seeds because it was "the only
processor of sugar beets geographically accessible to the U & I
company," and it would only process beets grown from Betaseed's
seeds.50
Unlike Betaseed, Intel's licensing proposals furthered no illegal
relationship.5' Intel did not demand that Intergraph buy its products,
and the record described no market in which Intel's licensing
proposals were shown to have distorted competition. 52 The Federal
Circuit noted that the district court failed to explain its holding that
Intel's proposal to trade a license for the Clipper patent in exchange
for continuation of the "strategic customer" program violated both
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5 3 The district court failed to set
forth the following necessary elements under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act: (1) "specific intent to monopolize;" (2) conduct that
threatens actual monopolization; and (3) "harm to competition." 54
Moreover, "[c]ommercial negotiations to trade patent property
rights for other consideration in order to settle a patent dispute is
neither tying nor coercive reciprocity in violation of the Sherman
47. Id. at 1360.
48. Id. at 1360-61.
49. Id. at 1361.
50. Id. (citing Betaseed, Inc. v. U&I Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1216 (9th Cir. 1982)). See
Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1978).
51. Id. at 1361.
52. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1361.
53. See id. The Sherman Act does not require parties to bargain as equals.
54. Id.
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Act. '55 Therefore, the Federal Circuit found that the district court
erred in ruling that Intel's activities violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act under the theories of coercive reciprocity and tying.
56
E. Use of Intellectual Property to Restrain Trade
The Federal Circuit further held that the district court erred in
finding that Intel was using its intellectual property to restrain trade;
specifically, the district court incorrectly rejected Intel's argument
that its proprietary information and pre-release products were subject
to copyright and patent protection.5 7 The antitrust laws do not negate
the patentee's right to exclude others from patent propertyJ8 To wit,
"[a] patent holder who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for maintaining the [monopoly]
power he lawfully acquired by refusing to license the patent to
others."59
The Federal Circuit noted that, in supporting its finding that Intel
was using its intellectual property to restrain trade, the district court
relied on the proposition that "[u]nlawful exclusionary conduct can
include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a [patent or]
copyright or to sell a patented or copyrighted work. '60 However, the
district court apparently misconstrued the teachings of the Ninth
Circuit. In effect, the Ninth Circuit developed the following
rebuttable presumption: "'while exclusionary conduct can include a
monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a [patent or] copyright,' or
to sell its patented or copyrighted work, a monopolist's 'desire to
exclude others from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers."'61
Furthermore, the "Ninth Circuit ... found 'no reported case in which
a court imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or
license a patent or copyright."' 62 Similarly, the Federal Circuit found
55. Id. at 1362.
56. Id. at 1361.
57. See id. at 1362.
58. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1362. See also Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp.,
92 F.3d 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
59. Id. at 1362-63 (citing Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d
606,609 (6th Cir. 1987)).
60. Id. at 1362 (citing Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d
1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997)).
61. Image Technical Services, 125 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at
1187).
62. Id. at 1216.
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no such antitrust liability in this case.63
The Federal Circuit then noted that what was at issue before the
district court was not licenses to Intel's patents and copyrights; rather,
Intergraph sought a preferred position as to the products that embody
this intellectual property before they are commercially available, as
well as access to trade secrets. 64 Even though a key intellectual
property right at issue was trade secrets and not copyrights or patents,
the Federal Circuit had no difficulty holding that "the owner of
proprietary information has no obligation to provide it, whether to a
competitor, customer, or supplier. ' 65  Thus, "a customer who is
dependent on a manufacturer's supply of a component can not [sic]
on that ground force the producer to provide it; there must also be an
anticompetitive aspect invoking the Sherman Act. '66  In sum, the
Federal Circuit found no antitrust liability under a use of intellectual
property to restrain trade theory.
F. Breach of Contract
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that the district court also
based its grant of injunction on a contract theory.67 Here, the district
court cited a letter from Intel to Intergraph stating that Intergraph
would be treated as "a strategic customer in present and future
programs" that are "currently being managed under Non-Disclosure
Agreements. '68 The Federal Circit rejected this alternative basis for
the injunction, focusing on the total lack of detail in the supposed
contract. 69 Specifically, the court set forth the following:
[T]he letter's broad usages, its lack of specificity, and its silence on
virtually all of the elements of a contract, negate its interpretation
as replacing the non-disclosure agreements with specific
obligations, and separate it from the sort of document subject to a
"gap-filler" expedient. There [was] no gap-filling exercise that can
reasonably include all of the terms of the district court's injunction
63. See htergraph, 195 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Image Technical Services, 125 F.3d at
1216). See CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that Xerox
was under no obligation to sell or license its patented parts or its copyrighted works and did not
violate the antitrust laws by refusing to do so).
64. See htergraph, 195 F.3d at 1363.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1366.
68. Id. (citing Intergraph, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1267).
69. See id.
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order.70
ll. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Federal Circuit held that the antitrust rulings of the
district court were incorrect in law or were devoid of sufficient factual
support to present a substantial likelihood of establishing an antitrust
law violation with respect to the issues presented. 71 This decision
reinforces the well-established proposition, ignored by the district
court, that the mere presence of monopoly power is not actionable; a
successful antitrust claim requires harm to competition.
Likewise, this decision is support for the proposition, repeatedly
championed by the Federal Circuit but open to some question in the
Ninth Circuit, that the exercise of rights inherent in intellectual
property will rarely, if ever, lead to antitrust liability.
70. Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1366 (citing ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-305 to -310 (1965)).
71. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1352.
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